

Malicious Firefox Extensions

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Introduction

IE : ActiveX controls, Browser Helper Objects (BHO), ...

Firefox : extensions, language packs, themes, plugins...

Firefox extensions are as powerful, or even more powerful, than ActiveX controls:

- ▶ Can be programmed in **Javascript**, **C/C++**, Python, etc.
- ▶ Can contain **native code** and run it;
- ▶ Usually **cross-platform**.

Stealth

- ▶ Hiding from the extensions list;
- ▶ Polymorphism, packing, etc.;
- ▶ Infecting other extensions (even when signed);
- ▶ Can be silently installed by native code;
- ▶ All malicious activity (code and network communication) is part of Firefox's innocuous activity.

XPCOM: cross-platform API exposed by Firefox to extensions.

- ▶ r/w access to the **DOM** (Document Object Model) of accessed pages, before and after being displayed \Rightarrow keylogging, personal info stealing, tampering Internet voting, etc.
- ▶ Clear access to **passwords** stored by Firefox;
- ▶ r/w access to the **filesystem**, the **network** (opening client and server sockets, sending mails, etc.) ;
- ▶ ... (more to explore, but it's large !)

Demo

Anatomy of a Security Disaster?

- Javascript simplicity
- + Browsers ubiquity
- + Browsers' use for sensitive applications
- + Platform independence
- + No security policy

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